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Abstract
Algorithmic proof-search is an essential enabling technology throughout informatics.
Proof-search is the proof-theoretic realization of the formulation of logic not as a
theory of deduction but rather as a theory of reduction. Whilst deductive logics
typically have a well-developed semantics of proofs, reductive logics are typically
well-understood only operationally. Each deductive system can, typically, be read as
a corresponding reductive system. We discuss some of the problems which must be
addressed in order to provide a semantics of proof-searches of comparable value to
the corresponding semantics of proofs. Just as the semantics of proofs is intimately
related to the model theory of the underlying logic, so too should be the semantics
of proof-searches. We discuss how to solve the problem of providing a semantics for
proof-searches which adequately models both operational and logical aspects of the
reductive system.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic proof-search is an essential enabling technology throughout infor-
matics. Proof-search is the proof-theoretic realization of the formulation of
logic not as a theory of deduction but rather as a theory of reduction. Whilst
deductive logics typically have a well-developed semantics of proofs, reductive
logics are typically well-understood only operationally. Each deductive system
can, typically, be read as a corresponding reductive system. We discuss some
of the problems which must be addressed in order or provide a semantics of
proof-searches of comparable value to the corresponding semantics of proofs.
Just as the semantics of proofs is intimately related to the model theory of
the underlying logic, so too should be the semantics of proof-searches. We
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discuss how to solve the problem of providing a semantics for proof-searches
which adequately models both operational and logical aspects of the reductive
system.
Although our focus here is on proof-search and its semantics, its coun-
terpart in truth-functional semantics, i.e., model checking, provides an alter-
native perspective on reductive logic. We are certainly concerned to ensure
that we develop a theory which is a good ﬁt with model checking. However,
discussion of these aspects is beyond our present scope and will be addressed
elsewhere.
These notes are in many ways incomplete. In particular, we have, for
brevity, refrained from providing any substantial detail of the semantic struc-
tures considered. Moreover, we do not claim to have fully investigated the lines
of research herein. Rather, we sketch some aspects of our current research.
In § 2, we introduce the proof-theoretic view of reductive logic. In § 3, we
discuss the formulation and roˆle of the semantics of proofs and consider how
the logical aspects of a similar semantics of proof-searches might be formu-
lated. In § 4, we consider how to incorporate into the semantics an interpre-
tation of a deterministic operational semantics. Finally, in § 6, we summarize
our position and sketch our programme of research towards a semantics for
proof-search.
2 Proof and proof-search
Deductive inference proceeds from established or supposed premisses to a con-
clusion, regulated by the application of inference rules, R,
⇓ Premiss1 . . .Premissm
Conclusion
R.
A proof is constructed, inductively, by applying instances of rules of this form
to proofs of established premisses, thereby constructing a proof of the given
conclusion.
Reductive inference proceeds from a putative conclusion to suﬃcient pre-
misses, regulated by reduction operators, OR,
⇑ SuﬃcientPremiss1 . . .SuﬃcientPremissm
PutativeConclusion
OR,
corresponding to (admissible) rules, R. The author believes that this idea
of reduction was ﬁrst explained in these terms by Kleene [18]. A search is
constructed, inductively, by applying instances of reduction operators of this
form to putative conclusions of which a proof is desired, thereby yielding a
collection of suﬃcient premisses, proofs of which would be suﬃcient to imply
the existence of a proof, obtainable by deduction, of the putative conclusion.
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The key diﬀerence between reduction and deduction is that deduction are
always total, i.e., whenever a rule is applicable to a complete set of established
premisses, then the conclusion of the rules can always be obtained, whereas
reductions are, in general, partial, i.e., when a reduction operator is applied
to a putative conclusion, there is no guarantee that all, or indeed any, of the
suﬃcient premisses will be provable. The leaves of a search are not necessarily
axioms, φ  φ, where φ is an atomic formula, of the underlying logic. Rather,
they are a more general class of atomic judgements, φ  ψ, where φ and ψ are
atomic.
For the purposes of this paper, we shall assume that the proofs, and the
searches, in a logic, are structured as trees and that such trees can be rep-
resented as the terms of a language of proofs. For example, the proofs of
intuitionistic logic can be represented as trees generated by Gentzen’s natural
deduction system NJ or sequent calculus LJ [7]. We emphasize, however, our
conjecture that our analysis extends to a range of other graphical structures
without undue diﬃculty.
We conclude by remarking that one of the leading examples of reductive
proof, namely classical clausal resolution [31], is often rendered in deductive
form. The trick is to formulate the search for a proof of a formula as an attempt
to deduce a contradiction from the negation of the formula [34]. Failure then
arises as the failure of any instance of resolution to be applicable before a
contradiction has been obtained. We suggest that a reductive formulation is
more illuminating.
3 Semantics
What good is a semantics ? What is a good semantics ? Of course, the answers
to these questions are much the same. For deductive logic, the key point is that
the semantics should provide not only a more “abstract” interpretation of the
syntax of the logic, including its proofs, but also an account of the meaning of
the constructs of the logic, typically via an account of which judgments hold,
e.g., are “true”, in which states of aﬀairs, e.g., worlds.
The requirements for a semantics of deductive logic also obtain for reduc-
tive logic but we must add to these a requirement to adequately represent the
operational aspects of the logic, q.v. § 4.
3.1 Semantics of proofs
The semantics of intuitionistic logic and, to varying degrees, of substructural,
classical and modal systems too, can be elegantly summarized by the so-called
propositions-as-types-as-objects triangle, q.v. Figure 1, in which (natural de-
duction) proofs correspond to (typed) λ-terms which correspond to classes
arrows in categories with speciﬁed structure.
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Φ ⇒ Γ  φ ﬀ  [Γ]  [Φ] : [φ]




 



	
[[Γ]]
[[Φ]]−→ [[φ]]
Fig. 1. Propositions-as-types-as-objects
The triangle provides a framework within which the proof theory, model
theory and computational interpretation of systems can be formulated. For
example:
• Intuitionistic logic: Here the correspondence between propositions and types
[12,1] is particularly strong. At the propositional level, one obtains a close
proof-theoretic analysis via the simply-typed λ-calculus which extend to
the predicate level via dependently-typed λ-calculi. Semantically, Kripke’s
possible-worlds models of propositional consequence can be generalized to
interpret proofs. At the propositional level, bi-cartesian closed categories, 3
such as presheaf categories of the form SetW , where W is a small category
of worlds, are suﬃcient. At the predicate level, the essential structure of
proofs is captured by ﬁbrations, or indexed categories, with speciﬁed extra
structure [17,25,6], q.v. Figure 2:
· The arrows σ in the base category are substitutions, i.e., maps between
the sets Y and X of variables;
· The arrows Γ Φ−→ φ in the ﬁbre F (X) over the set X of variables interpret
proofs of sequents formed using the variables in X;
· Substitution lifts from the base to the ﬁbres via the contravariance in the
ﬁbration:
Y
σ−→ X → F (X) σ∗−→ F (Y ) ;
• MILL and BI: Here again the correspondence works well at the proposi-
tional level (no predicates or quantiﬁers). For MILL without exponentials,
and so without any treatment of intuitionistic logic, we get a corresponding
simply-typed λ-calculus which can be interpreted in a symmetric monoidal
closed category [20]. For MILL with the exponential, !, we once again get
a simply-typed λ-calculus but it must be interpreted in a complex structure
involving a monoidal adjunction between a symmetric monoidal closed cat-
egory and cartesian closed category. For BI, we get a simply-typed lambda-
calculus, with both multiplicative (or linear) and additive (or intuitionistic)
function spaces, which can be interpreted in a (bi-cartesian doubly closed
category, i.e., a category which enjoys monoidal two closed structures, one
3 A CCC is bi -cartesian closed if it is also bi-cartesian, i.e., has co-products as well as
products.
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X
Y
σ


F (X)
X Γ  φ
F (Y )
Y σ∗(Γ)  σ∗(φ)
Fig. 2. Fibred Models of Proofs
of which is bi-cartesian. At the predicate level, the analysis is less clear.
The λΛ-calculus [14,13,15,16] is a dependently-typed λ-calculus which pro-
vides a partial analysis, being both in the spirit of BI and yet somewhat
reliant on the presence of a form of Dereliction. Nevertheless, λΛ can be
interpreted in the general ﬁbred framework sketched in Figure 2;
• Classical logic: the λμ- and λμν-calculi [22,26,27,29,30] allow the presenta-
tion of a semantics of the proofs of propositional classical logic within the
ﬁbred framework [29]. In λμ(ν), sequents are structured so as to have a
chosen active position on the right (the left-most position),
Γ  t : φ,Δ,
where the term t inhabits (in the sense of the propositions-as-types corre-
spondence) the formula, φ, in the context of the formulæ in Δ. A ﬁbred
semantics is obtained by taking a base category in which the objects are
(interpretations of) the Δs, the non-active formulæ, and the arrows are
(interpretations of) structural operations, such as Weakening, Contraction
and, critically, Exchange. The ﬁbres are then cartesian closed categories in
which the “active” sequent Γ  t : φ can be interpreted, subject to various
structural conditions.
All of these examples, and many more besides, can be seen as ﬁtting into
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a model-theoretic framework based on a formulation of Kripke-Beth-Joyal
semantics [19] in a general setting based on ﬁbred (or indexed) categories
[25,6,15,16]. The basic idea is that a model,
M = 〈Struct, [[−]]〉
consists of structure, Struct, together with an interpretation, [[−]], of the syn-
tax of the logic in the structure. The structure is given by a functor,
Struct : [W , [Bop,V ]],
in which
• W is a (small) category of worlds,
• B is a (small) category which interprets the term language of the logic, and
• V is a category of values which interprets the consequences, the sequents,
of the logic.
We require the structure to carry additional structure, according to the logic
to be interpreted. For example, to interpret intuitionistic predicate logic, we
require, inter alia, that B have products, each ﬁbre (object of V) be cartesian
closed and that certain functors between ﬁbres interpret the quantiﬁers. To
interpret the dependent type theory corresponding to intuitionistic predicate
logic, we must impose a more intimate relationship between the base and the
ﬁbres by requiring that the product, or extension combinator, in the base be
constrained to apply to the objects deﬁnable in the corresponding ﬁbre [25,6].
Turning brieﬂy to equality, the appropriate equivalence relation on proofs
is derived from properties such as normalization and cut-elimination. Seman-
tically, these properties correspond to properties such as coherence.
3.2 Semantics of proof-searches
We have seen that the propositions-as-types-as-objects correspondence pro-
vides a framework within which the semantics and proof theory of a wide
variety of deductive logics can be formulated and analysed.
So it seems valuable to ask whether such a framework can be provided for
the formulation and analysis of reductive logics. The desired set-up is sketched
in Figure 3, in which Γ ?- φ denotes a sequent which is a putative conclusion
and Φ ⇒ Γ ?- φ denotes that Φ is a search with root Γ ?- φ. The judgement
[Γ] |∼ [Φ] : [φ] indicates that [Φ] is a realizer of [φ] with respect to assumptions
[Γ]. The deﬁnition of such a realizer is problematic and discussed below.
It is clear that provision of such a framework is a non-trivial problem. The
main diﬃculty is that the objects constructed during a search, i.e., a reduc-
tion, are, in contrast to the objects, i.e., proofs, constructed during deduction,
6
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Φ ⇒ Γ ?- φ ﬀ  [Γ] |∼ [Φ] : [φ]




 



	
[[Γ]]
[[Φ]] [[φ]]
Fig. 3. Searches-as-realizers-as-arrows
inherently partial. Whilst any deduction proceeds from axioms to a guaran-
teed conclusion and so constructs a proof, searches proceed from a putative
conclusion to suﬃcient premisses. At any intermediate stage, it can be that it
is impossible to complete the search so as to obtain a proof, i.e., all possible
reductions lead to trees in which there are leaves of the form φ ?- ψ in which
the formulæ φ and ψ are both distinct and irreducible. 4
Suppose, then, that we have a deductive system D which is interpreted in
a category C. Consider the interpretation of an axiom sequent, φ  φ, given
by
[[φ]]
1[[φ]]−→ [[φ]],
the identity arrow from [[φ]] to itself. Proof trees over D have the property
that all leaves have this form (or something very like it).
Now consider the reductive system S(D), obtained by reading each of D’s
inference rules as reduction operators. Search trees over S(D) can have leaves
of the form φ  ψ, where φ and ψ are distinct, irreducible formulæ, so that
there is no way to reduce the leaf to an axiom of the deductive system. A
semantics of searches in S(D) must interpret leaves of this form.
One solution is to interpret searches not in the category C but in the
polynomial category C[α] over an indeterminate α. 5
[Aside: If A and B are objects of a category C, we can adjoin an indeter-
minate A
α−→ B by forming the polynomial category C[α]. The objects of C[α]
are the objects of C and the arrows of C[α] are formed freely from the arrows
of C together with the new arrow α. The basic ideas may be found in [19].]
Then the interpretation of a leaf of the form φ ?- ψ can be deﬁned as
follows:
[[φ]]
α−→ [[ψ]].
The corresponding language of realizers is the internal language of C[α].
4 We say that an occurrence of a formula φ, in a search tree over a system S, is irreducible
if it is not the principal formula of an instance of any reduction operator of S.
5 In general, the polynomial over a set of indeterminates.
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Whilst polynomials over categories of proofs provide a place within which
searches can be interpreted, there is much more to consider in the semantics of
search. The key point is that the denotational semantics of the search process
is inherently intuitionistic: the search procedure, let’s think of it as an agent,
can be seen as van Dalen’s creative subject [3] exploring a Kripke frame (W,)
in which the ordering is generated by the reduction operators of the logic. At
each reduction, starting from a given endsequent, the creative subject increases
his knowledge of established atomic propositions. For example, illustrated in
Figure 4, suppose we have, in intuitionistic logic, the endsequent 6
φ ; φ ⊃ ψ ; φ ⊃ χ  (ψ ∨ ψ′) ∧ (χ ∨ χ′),
in which φ, ψ, ψ′, χ and χ′ are atomic. At the root world, w1, the only atomic
proposition established on the left, potentially capable, in the presence of a
matching φ on the right, of forming an axiom sequent φ  φ, is φ. 7
The next two reductions, ∧R and ∨R, take us to worlds w2 and then w3
and w4 without adding to the atomic propositions established on the left. Next
comes a ⊃ L, with principal formula φ ⊃ ψ. This step adds ψ to the atomic
formulæ established on the left, and so capable of contributing to axioms.
As before, the accession to worlds w6 and w7, via an ∨R, adds no atoms to
the left. Finally, the ⊃ L leading to w8 adds χ to the collection of formulæ
established on the left.
Each reduction increases (or, at least, does not decrease) the number of
established (atomic) propositions on the left. Of course, there is a potential
problem here with Weakening,
⇑ Γ ?- ψ
Γ , φ ?- ψ
W.
Such a reduction may lead to a world able to establish fewer facts than in its
ancestor, contradicting the usual hereditary condition in Kripke-like semantics.
However, we can work with presentations of intuitionistic and classical logic
in which Weakening is incorporated into the form of the axiom and so need
not be taken as a reduction operator.
Note that this point of view also makes sense substructurally. Consider,
for example, the endsequent
φ , φ−◦ψ ?- ψ ∨ ψ′
in multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic [9] (a similar example can be for-
mulated in BI [21,23,24]). A sketch of a Kripke model generated by a search
6 We use “;” as the antecedent-constructor for intuitionistic logic to distinguish it from the
“,” used in a later example based on linear logic.
7 Our use of just atoms to form axioms should be considered analogous to the use of atoms
in a least Herbrand model [5].
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w1
w2
∧R


∨R 


∨R
w3 w4


⊃ L
w5


∨R 


∨R
w6 w7


⊃ L
w8
w1: φ
w2: φ
w3: φ
w4: φ
w5: φ , ψ
w6: φ , ψ
w7: φ , ψ
w8: φ , ψ , χ
Fig. 4. Search Semantics as Kripke Semantics
for a proof of it is given in Figure 5. As in the previous example, the ∨R
does not add any established atomic propositions to the left-hand side. The
−◦L is, however, more interesting. It adds, in this case ψ, to the collection
of atoms which occur on the left on some branch of the search, which has
two branches at this point, one being φ ?- φ and the other being ψ ?- ψ: the
collection (multiset) of atoms occuring on some branch is thus {φ, ψ}. Of
course, in order to ensure that such models do not violate various substruc-
tural conditions, such as a requirement that axioms be exactly of the form
φ ?- φ, we must impose additional conditions. One way to do this might be
via a forcing relation for the substructural connectives. If the worlds for such
a semantics are drawn from a commutative monoid, then the world w4 might
be considered to decompose as a monoidal product of worlds, {φ} ·{ψ}, where
· is multiset union, with the component worlds {φ} and {ψ} forcing φ and ψ,
respectively. 8 Another way to do this, algebraically, might be along the lines
of the method of Boolean constraint equations explained in [10].
The φ and ψ, here both established at w4, occur in diﬀerent sequents just
as before. The diﬀerence here is that, in this system, there is no possiblity of
generating  using the operators corresponding to Contraction or Weakening,
⇑ Γ , φ , φ ?- ψ
Γ , φ ?- ψ
C ⇑ Γ ?- ψ
Γ , φ ?- ψ
W.
8 If the monoid is also preordered, then it might also provide the worlds for a forcing
semantics of the intuitionistic connectives (see [24,21,23]).
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w1


 


w2 w3
w4
w1: φ
w2: φ
w3: φ
w4: φ , ψ
Fig. 5. Substructural Search Semantics as Kripke Semantics
It follows that we might expect to interpret reductive logic in models based
on families of polynomial categories indexed by Kripke worlds [27]. Note that
possible-worlds aspect of this choice of semantics is somewhat independent
of the underlying deductive logic: We have indicated that both intuitionistic
and substructural systems can be treated in this way but so too can classical
systems.
Turning brieﬂy once again to equality, we must note an important diﬀer-
ence between deduction and reduction, motivated by the very high computa-
tional complexity of proof-search problems. Consider, for example, following
[35], searches for proofs of the sequent
∃x.∀y.p(x, y) ?- ∀v.∃u.p(u, v).
One search is given in (1). This search fails because there is no way to
instantiate the existential so as to form a deductive axiom. Note, however,
that we reach a perfectly good leaf of the search which can be interpreted in
the appropriate polynomial construction.
? ∃L
p(a, b) ?- ∃u.p(u, c) ∀R
p(a, b) ?- ∀v.∃u.p(u, v) ∀L∀y.p(a, y) ?- ∀v.∃u.p(u, v) ∃L∃x.∀y.p(x, y) ?- ∀v.∃u.p(u, v)
(1)
However, all is not lost. A simple reordering, or permutation, of the re-
ductions of the quantiﬁers yields the following search tree:
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p(a, b) ?- p(a, b) ∃R
p(a, b) ?- ∃u.p(u, b) ∀L∀y.p(a, y) ?- ∃u.p(u, b) ∀R∀y.p(a, y) ?- ∀v.∃u.p(u, v) ∃L∃x.∀y.p(x, y) ?- ∀v.∃u.p(u, v)
(2)
As shown in [35,28], the existence of the latter search can be calculated
from the former via the technology of reduction orderings. Such an ordering,
which compares the structure of formulæ and substitutions with the structure
of the search tree, induces an equality on searches which should be respected
in the semantics.
Whilst it is clearly desirable to have a good semantics for searches, we are,
of course, interested in calculating proofs in the underlying deductive logic,
paying due attention to issues such as permutation, as discussed above. Our
position in these notes, then, is that proof-search, i.e., reductive logic, de-
mands an essentially intuitionistic semantics, even if the underlying deductive
logic is classical, and that we must understand the relationship between the in-
tuitionistic semantics of search and the semantics of the underlying deductive
logic.
4 Control and its semantics
Deductive inferences are many-to-one: before an instance of an inference,
⇓ Premiss1 . . .Premissm
Conclusion
R,
may be performed, each of the m premisses must be established and the order
in which they are established is of little importance. 9
Reductive inference, in contrast, is one-to-many: in order to apply an
instance of reduction,
⇑ SuﬃcientPremiss1 . . .SuﬃcientPremissm
PutativeConclusion
OR,
it is necessary only to have reduced as far the putative conclusion, yielding m
suﬃcient premisses, i.e., m new putative conclusions.
It should now be clear that the pattern of choices of premisses made by
the search procedure has a critical impact on the outcome of the search. For
example, in systems such as Prolog [5,8,33], one premiss might lead to looping
9 More important, perhaps, in systems which combine top-down and bottom-up reasoning
[11].
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whereas another premiss might fail very quickly. These observations lead us
to the view that
Reductive Logic = Reduction + Control,
i.e., the speciﬁcation of a reductive logic requires not only the deﬁnition of
the reduction operators, corresponding to the rules of inference of a deductive
logic, but also a deﬁnition of the strategy which controls their use. See [8] for
a related discussion.
How, then, are we to formulate a semantics within which not only the
logical aspects of search but also the operational aspects can be adequately
represented ? Well, as we observed in § 2, perhaps the key distinction between
proof and search is the roˆle of failure.
Consider a search, with the underlying deductive system being intuitionis-
tic propositional logic, beginning with φ, φ ⊃ ψ ?- ψ ∨ ψ′. Suppose we choose
ﬁrst to apply the operator corresponding to ∨R, picking the branch on which
we have ψ′:
⇑ φ, φ ⊃ ψ ?- ψ
′
φ, φ ⊃ ψ ?- ψ′ ∨ ψ ∨R.
At this point, only remaining possible reduction is a ⊃ L with principal for-
mula φ ⊃ ψ:
⇑ φ ?- φ ψ ?- ψ
′
φ, φ ⊃ ψ ?- ψ′ ⊃ L.
Now we can only fail because there is not way to complete the right-hand
branch. Of course, we want to backtrack to the point at which we chose
the branch of the search space with ψ′ and choose the branch with ψ instead.
Backtracking, however, is computationally expensive and structurally non-too
elegant.
There is, however, an appealing solution. We can formulate our presen-
tation of intuitionistic logic so that the possibility of choosing ψ rather ψ′ is
recorded even on the branch of the search space corresponding to the choice
of ψ′. The key step is to use a multiple-conclusioned sequent calculus and
reformulate the ∨R rule, and its corresponding reduction operator, as follows:
Γ  φ, ψ,Δ
Γ  φ ∨ ψ,Δ .
Then the same sequence of reductions as the previous search now reaches
⇑ φ ?- φ ψ ?- ψ
′, ψ
φ, φ ⊃ ψ ?- ψ, ψ′ ⊃ L
and the right-hand leaf can be closed (Weakening on the right can be handled
just as Weakening on the left).
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One way to understand this point of view is provided by the presentation
of classical logic as the λμν-calculus, a term calculus for the classical sequents
which is analysed proof-theoretically in [29,30] and semantically in [26] (recall
the discussion in § 3). Recall that in this view, in which sequents are structured
so as to have a chosen active position on the right (the left-most position),
Γ  t : φ,Δ,
where the term t inhabits (in the sense of the propositions-as-types correspon-
dence) the formula, φ, in the context of the formulæ in Δ. The non-active
part of the right-hand side, Δ, is seen as a “scratchpad”, or storage zone. If
we consider the intuitionistic search space as being embedded in the classi-
cal search space, as we can see our approach above, 10 then we can use the
scratchpad to record the choices made during search and the inhabiting term
t to provide access to the store. In our example, the requisite ψ is stored in
the sequent and can be accessed by exchanging it into the active position.
Semantically, the choice of embedding in the classical calculus is very
helpful. We have seen that the semantics of λμν ﬁts well within the ﬁbred,
“propositions-as-types-as-objects”, framework. However, a semantics of λμν
based on a category of continuations can also be given and this semantics can
be presented within the ﬁbred framework [26]. Within this setting, backtrack-
ing is modelled by exchanging the active formula, which is interpreted as an
arrow in the base category of the ﬁbration.
There is, however, much more to control than backtracking. For example,
in order to determine an execution strategy, we must choose
• which premiss to work on next,
• which instance of which rule to apply next, and
• which point at which a choice was made to which to backtrack.
Consider, for example, the execution of a presentation of a version of Prolog,
based on the uniform proof procedure for hereditary Harrop formulæ, i.e., the
class of formulæ mutually inductively deﬁned by
Deﬁnite formulæ D ::= A | D ∧D | G ⊃ A
Goal formulæ G ::= A | G ∧G | G ∨G | D ⊃ G.
Uniform proofs, viewed as reductions, are those in which right rules are always
preferred over left rules where both are applicable. 11 How can this structure be
10 It is not clear that the move all the way to a classical calculus is necessary: a muliple-
conclusioned presentation of intuitionistic logic [4] may be suﬃcient (cf. [29,30]).
11 Uniform proofs are complete for hereditary Harrop sequents, i.e., sequents which have
exactly D-formuIæ on the left and G-formulæ on the right. In fact, without loss of com-
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characterized declaratively ? The binary rules yield two premisses; how are we
to specify declaratively the procedure to choose which premiss to reduce ﬁrst ?
At a stage at which all possible right reductions have been performed, how
are we to specify declaratively the procedure to choose which of the applicable
instances of ⊃ L, e.g., the left-most, to apply ?
One solution is to impose the following orderings:
• On the set of rule schemata:
{(∧L)  (∧R), (∨R), (⊃ R)  (⊃ L)}
Here we suppress the speciﬁcation of the ordering between the right rules. In
single-conclusioned systems, no choice is possible; in multiple-conclusioned
systems, it can depend upon the permutability properties of the calculus.
• For each binary rule, an ordering on the premisses: 12
⇑ Γ ?- G1,Δ ⊆ Γ ?- G2,Δ
Γ ?- G1 ∧G2,Δ ∧R
To see how this works, consider the construction of a uniform proof of
D ?- A ∧B,A ⊃ B,
where A and B are atomic. The ordering on rules directs us to work ﬁrst on
the right. Reducing the ∧ takes us to
(1) D ?- A,A ⊃ B and (2) D ?- B,A ⊃ B.
Now, the ordering on the premisses of the ∧R rule directs us to reduce (1)
next, leading to
D,A ?- A,B
which is an axiom. At this point a success continuation directs us to the
next (left-most, say) uncompleted branch; we soon succeed. Here we have
suppressed the details of the exchanges required to move a chosen formula to
the active position.
Of course, we should like to integrate ordering constraints such as these
(we have greatly simpliﬁed the ideas for these notes) into the deﬁnition of a
model of proof-search. To this end, we conjecture that working not merely
with the interpretations of the syntactic constructs of the language but rather
with algebraic actions, i.e., actions of orders, on these constructions. Thus
pleteness, we restrict the ⊃ L rule to those cases in which the head of the implicational
formula matches with the (necessarily) atomic goal. Also, we can initially perform all of
the ∧L rules below any given ⊃ R, thereby reducing the applicable left rules to ⊃ L.
12 Recall that we have restricted ⊃ L to be unary.
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we seek to import the technology of domain theory, which provides a well-
developed account of order and limit, into the model-theoretic semantics of
proof-search.
5 An application: the denotational semantics of logic
programs
The concerns we have discussed are all very intriguing and amusing but are
there any applications ? Perhaps the most obvious application is to the deno-
tational semantics of logic programs.
There are two main approaches to the semantics of logic programs.
• First, the TP operator used in the semantics of (intuitionistic) logic programs
[5]. Here, a mapping, TP , is deﬁned from interpretations to interpretations,
in which the image is the result of applying the rules of the program, P , to
the initial interpretation via a combination of modus ponens and uniﬁcation.
The semantics of the program is then given by the least ﬁxed point of this
operator, a co-limit of ordinal powers of TP . It is interesting to note that this
forward chaining system is traditionally used to provide a ﬁxpoint semantics
for SLD-resolution [5], a backward chaining system (cf. the discussion in
[11]). The TP semantics is very good logically. It gives a term model of the
underlying logic and includes an explicit measure of the “logical complexity”
of a goal, i.e., the power of TP at which the goal can be proved.
However, the TP semantics is quite poor in its treatment of the execution
dynamics of P . For example, a given program P can either terminate or loop
depending upon the choice of strategy, yet the TP semantics will not distin-
guish the two systems. Our position is that diﬀerent strategies determine
diﬀerent logics and that a good semantics must make such distinctions.
• Second, a denotational semantics of the execution of Prolog programs can
be given in the usual domain-theoretic style [32].
Our position is that a good semantics of logic programs must account for
both the logical and operational aspects of the meaning of a program.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced the problem of providing a semantics for reductive proof
theory, i.e., for proof-search. We have sketched a solution which can be un-
derstood to develop in three steps:
• First, a basic, logically adequate semantics of searches, analogous to a se-
mantics of proofs;
• Second, an extension of the basic semantics to handle backtracking; and
• Third, a further extension to handle strategies, thereby completing the mod-
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elling of control.
Applications of this technology, other than to logic programming, which we
discussed in § 5, might be to
• logical frameworks and their associated theorem provers, and
• computer algebra systems.
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